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Conventional analysis of the decision of  expected utility 
maximizing agent s  to vote has concluded that i t  is irrational to 
vote unless voters have a distorted view of  their individual impact 
or place a direct value on the act of voting. 1 On the other hand , 
mathematical analyses of the electoral process ( see , e.g. , Davis , 
Hinich , Ordeshook (1970) ) ,  have usually assumed that all voters 
vote.2 Each theory is incorrect in the sense that in actual e lections
turnout is neither zero nor 100%. 
In this paper we will argue that previous analyses of  
expected utility maximizing voters s topped too soon because of the 
partial equilibrium approach and that if each voter considers the 
simultaneous reactions of all voters in a "rational" manner , then 
depending on the locat ion of the candidates ' platforms , turnout will 
usually be positive but less than 100%. In particular we will derive 
a (probabilistic) vote supply function , given a distribution o f  
voters and the choice of platforms of candidates, which has the 
property that , even with costs of voting,  unless the candidates have 
identical p lat forms the expected turnout is positive. The model 
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and these results are presented in sections la and lb. 
S ince Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974) and (1975)  have presented 
persuasive theoret ical and emp irical arguments that another form of 
rational behavio r ,  minimax regre t ,  is realistic and has the property 
that turnout is positive (unless p lat forms are identical) ,  we spend 
sometime comparing the implicat ions of the ir model and ours . 
Essentially what we claim is that our model predicts larger turnout 
than their model when preferences ( ideal points) are symmetrically 
distributed , candidates ' platforms are close and the variance of 
tastes is small (with concave utility funct ions ) or large (with a 
type of c onvex utility function ) .  Predicted turnout i s  larger in 
their model for opposite values. Thus , neither dominates the other 
with respect to predicted turnout. This is discussed in detail 
in section le. 
The results concerning turnout and voter behavior in 
both mode ls depend on the candidates ' choices of their p latforms. 
Thus a natural question to ask is "what will candidates do , given 
out model of voters?" This furthers the move to a general equilibrium 
approach s ince now both candidate s '  behavior and voters ' behavior 
are s imultaneously determined. Using expected plurality maximizing 
behavior for 2 candidate elections , the results of our inve s tigation 
are mixed. For concave utility functions and symmetrically dis tributed 
ideal poin t s ,  equilibrium occurs with both candidates choosing the 
median ideal point and no voter voting--since platforms are identical. 
Further if  ideal points are asymme trically distributed in the tails 
of the distribut ions ( i.e. at extreme distances from the median) then 
usually no general equilibrium will exist. These results appear in 
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sections 2 a ,  2b ( i) , and 2b ( ii) . 
On the other hand , if utility functions are convex on each 
side of the ideal point and if tastes are unimodal and not too 
asymmetric then a general equilibrium exists with candidates choosing 
identical platforms at the modal ideal point and no voter voting. 
These results are included in section 2b (iii) . 
A summary o f  results is provided in section 2 c  with some 
additional remarks. One deserves emphasis. In general equilibrium 
with expected p lurality maximizing candidates the outcome is identical 
for two models of voter behavior : ours and minimax regret. That 
is both models predict , in equilibrium, identical candidate platforms 
and no voter turnout if costs of voting are positive. 
In sect ion 3 we consider three additional problems : (a) the 
implications of vote maximizing candidates--turnout is positive in 
equilibrium if it exis t s ,  (b) M candidate elections for M � 2 ,  although 
no general equilibrium results are presented where candidate behavior 
is included ,  and ( c) s ome remarks on testing models of simultaneous 
voter and candidate behavior--particularly our model. This section 
concludes the paper . 
1. Voter (partial) Equilibrium - 2 candidates
We begin with the conventional analysis of  the vot ing 
decision of a single voter in the spirit of Downs , Tullock , Riker-
Ordeshook and Ferej ohn-Fiorina . In this model , candidates A and B 
select plat forms GA , GB £ H, an issue space . A voter then vote s 
for (say) A if and only if the expected utility from so doing 
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outweighs the expected utility from voting for B or from abstaining. 
a. The conventional analysis
We consider a model with n + 1 voters indexed by i = 1 ,  
2 ,  • • •  , n + 1 .  Each voter has preferences over a set o f  possible 
issues , T .  There are two candidates indexed j A , B  where 
G .  £ T is j ' s platform. When a voter votes for a particular J 
candidate ( or abstains) he is implicitly selecting a gamble since 
at the time of the decision he does not know how other voters will 
vote. We make the standard assumption that the voter making the 
decision under uncertainty acts as if he maximizes expected utility. 
Assumption 1 :  With each voter i is associated a 
utility function Ui on H such that
( a) (candidate irrelevance) i prefers candidate A to B 
if and only if U
i 
( GA) > U
i ( GB) and 
(b) (expected utility hypothesis) letting (TIA , ITB , GA
, GB) 
represent the gamb le that j is elected on p latform Gj with probability
IT .  ( for j J 
if and only 
( G�) .
' ' ' ' 
A , B) , voter i prefers (TIA' ITB , GA' GB) to (TIA , ITB , GA , GB) 
. i i I i I I i if TIA • u ( GA) + rrB • u (GB) > TIA • u ( GA) + rrB • u 
To ease the exposition and pave the way for later analysis , 
we make the addit ional assumpt ion that each voter ' s (expected) utility 
function can be parameterized. That is , we let D be a space of  
voters ' characteristics and let  Ui (G) = U(G,  di) be the utility of
i for 8 if his characteris tic is di £ D. Three simple examples may 
help the reader understand the notat ion. 
Example 1 :  (Type I preferences3) Let H = RL, the L 
dimensional Eucl idean space . Let D = R
L and let U (G, di) 
. . L 
- (G - d
i
) ' (G - d
i
) = - l Thus, every voter has a (Gt _ d
i
)
2 
t 
2=1 . 
quadrat ic utility ( loss) function, whose ideal point is d
i
, over L 
issues measured as real numbers . 
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Example 2 :  (Simple Social Choice) Let H {xl' x2, x3 } .
That is, there are only 3 alternatives . Le t D = R3 and let
i i i i i i i . U (�, d ) = dk 
for k =  1,2,3 . Thus, d = (d1, d2, d3) where dk 
is 
i's utility for alternative k .  
Example 3 :  (Type I I  preferences) Let H = RL, D = RL and 
. . 1 
U (G, di) - [ (G - d
i
) ' (G - d
i
) ]m m > 1 .  As for Type I preferences,
each voter has an ideal point di . However, while Type I preferences
are concave utility functions, Type II preferences are convex, on 
each s ide of di . As we will see, the behavior implied by Type I I
preferences is s ignificantly different from that b y  Type I preferences . 
A digression : Assumpt ion l (a) can be weakened in what 
follows to allow voter identification of candidates to be importan t .  
For example, suppose i believes ex ante that i f  j adopts the p latform 
G. then j will implement the p latform y, if elected, with probability J 
j i 2 (y' G. ' d ) . J Then i's ex ante utility for j, given the p lat form 
e. is wj CG. , di) =  J ucy, di) tj (y, J J G . , d
i) dy .  Thus i prefersJ 
A to B if and only if � (GA, d
i) > WB (GB' d
i) ,  and even if
GA = GB' i may prefer A to B .  S ince this leaves unexplained where
the t
i ( • ) likelihood functions come from and since this generality
tends to obscure the main issues, we will consider it again only if 
it has some significant bearing on the results to be derived. 
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One characteris tic ( in addition to di) which we also need
to consider is the cost of voting, ci . We will assume that 0 < _£ � 
c
i < 00 for all i ;  that is, all voters must incur a cos t if they vote 
and these costs are bounded away from 0 by .£· For shorthand purposes 
only we will let ei = (di, c
i) and Ei = D x [.£, oo) . 
Assumption 2 :  (no income effects) If  candidate j wins 
then voter i with characteristic ei receives utility U (G., di ) - Ci J 
if he votes, and U(G . , d
i) if he abstains . J 
Another digress ion : Assumption 2 could be weakened to: 
i receives U (G . ,  ci, d
i
) if i votes and j wins while i receivesJ 
U (G., 0, di) if j wins and i abs tains . Unfortunately this complicatesJ 
the analysis somewhat . Further, as far as I can tell, this weakening 
does not seem to alter the equilibrium results below. I will 
therefore stay with assumption 2 to ease expos ition and to remain 
as close as possible to the standard framework . 
We are now ready to analyze the voters decis ion . A voter 
has three possible acts : vote for A, vote for B, or abs tain . There 
are, essentially, 5 states of the world which must be considered . 
Let n . be the number of votes cast by the other n voters for J 
j = A, B .  ( S ince we allow abstentions nA + nB < n is pos s ible ) . 
The five s tates are : s1 where nA > nB + 1 ,  s2 where nA = nB + 1 ,  s3 
where nA = nB' s 4 where nB = nA + 1 ,  and s5 where nB > nA + 1 .  Let 
Pi be the probability of state k from i ' s point of view . 
Lemma 1: [Ferej ohn and Fiorina (1974) ) If tied elec tions 
are decided by a fair coin toss, then given GA' GB, e
i, and Pi 
(P� , . . . ,P�) ,  voter i maximizes expected utility by : (deleting the 
i on P
i
)
k 
voting for A if 
. 1 1) > -W(G, e 
P3 + P4
voting for B if - ! > W(0, ei) ,P2 P3 
abstaining if 1 i 1 -- < W(G, e ) < --
P2 + P3 P3 + P4 
i i 
U(GA, d ) - U(GB, d ) 
where W(G, ei) - 2c 
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(la) 
(lb ) 
(le) 
For precision the boundary cases in Lemma 1, when W(G, ei)
+ 
or W(G, e
i
) = - ! , should be dealt with .P3 P4 P2 P3 
1 At these values, 
i is indifferent between voting and abstaining . Thus one should make 
some assumption about the actual act chosen . Fortunately, this 
boundary situation will usually occur below with probability zero and 
may be safely ignored. If not, we will point out the implications at 
the appropriate t ime .  
At this point the conventional analysis notes that both 
p3 + p4 and p2 + p3 are objectively very small and, unless voters
inflate their estimates or receive a direct utility gain from voting, 
a rational expected utility maximizing citizen will decide to abstain . 
This contradicts empirical evidence since people do vote. Ferejohn 
and Fiorina suggest as a solution to this apparent dilemma that, 
instead of maximizing expected utility, voters act according to 
Savage ' s  minimax regret criterion . I t  is useful for later analysis 
to summarize their results here in our notation : 
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Lemma 2 :  [Ferejohn and Fiorina (19 74) ] If tied elections 
are decided by a fair coin toss, then given GA, GB' and e
i, voter i
minimizes his maximum regret by : 
voting for A if W(G, ei) > 2 (2a) 
voting for B if W(G, ei) < -2 (2b) 
Abstaining if -2 < W(G, ei) < 2 . (2c) 
We note that this is equivalent to expected utility maximizing if 
and only if p2 + p3 =-} = P3 + P4•
b .  Full rationality 
In this section we consider an alternative to both models 
discussed in la . In particular, we propose and analyze a solution 
to the paradox of voting suggested by Ferejohn and Fiorina but never 
followed up .
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The solution is brought about by assuming that each
voter is rational and that each assumes the others are also rational . 
This will allow us to calculate precisely what P� + P� and P� + P! 
are in the mind of each voter i .  Further we will be able t o  make 
some statements about expected turnout (which will, in general, be 
nonzero) .  
Assumption 3 : (a) (Each voter assumes all voters are 
rational) Each voter i believes all other voters follow the (expected 
utility maximizing) decision rules in Lemma 1. (b) (Independent-
identical beliefs) Each voter i believes other voters characteristics 
are independently and identically distributed on E according to the 
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probability measure µ .  
Thus although i doesn't know h ' s  characteristic and, therefore, 
doesn't know how h will vote, he does know how h will vote (or abstain) 
if h has the characteristic eh. He also believes that e
h is a
random variable drawn from µ .  For full rationality (as in a rational-
expectations equilibrium) one might want to assume that µ was the 
empirical distribution . Below it will be helpful to have µ "continuous" 
and thus we usually assume that the true distribution of characteristics 
is approximated by a continuous density functions . For large 
electorates this is not a severe limitation . 
Another Digression : The assumption of independent and 
identical beliefs is not crucial for much of what follows but does 
allow for considerable simplification of the analysis . We could 
replace A. 3 with the following weaker expectations hypothesis : 
i 1 i-1 i+l n . . Let z = [d , . . .  ,d , d , • • •  ,d ] and assume each i believes the
others' characteristics, zi, are distributed according to the measure
�
i
(e
i
) (zi) if i's characteristic is ei . In this case, i's expectations
can depend on ei whereas in assumption 3 they are independent of ei .
This is followed up in section 3b .  
Lemma 3 :  Under Assumptions 1-3 ,  given GA, GB' µ, and p
i
,
voter i believes the probability, q . ,  that an arbitrary voter h 
J 
(h  i i) votes for j = 0 ,  A, B (j = 0 means abstention) is : (assuming
i 
p p
h
)
qA 
1 1 - G(a' GA, G8) (3a) 
qB 
1 G(- B' GA, GB)
1 1 q
o = G(a' GA, GB) - G(- S' GA, GB)
i i i i i where a = p3 + p4, S = Pz + p3, and G(r, GA, GB) = µ({e E E 
i } . i I i 1 W(GA, GB' e ) � r ) [assuming that µ({e E E W(G, e ) = a'
. 
1 W(G, ei) = - S}) = O] .
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(3b )  
(3c) 
Proof : Straight forward application of Assumption 3 and 
Lemma 1. 
Notice that if µ is concentrated on a finite number of points 
(say, n + 1) then the last qualifying phrase, needed for the case 
of indifference between voting and abstaining, may be false. We will 
assume shortly that µ, GA and GB are such that G is continuous in r .
This will rule out µ concentrated on a finite number o f  characteristics 
and make the qualifying clause unnecessary . 
Now if voter i knows qA, qB and q0, he is in a position to 
calculate a = p3 + P4 and B = Pz + p3. 
Lemma 4 : Given qA, qB, and q0 
a = f (qA, qB)
B = f(qB, qA)
n 
L[zl n n-k k k n-2k where f(x,y) = (k) (  k ) x y (1-x-y) +k=o 
n-1 
(4a) 
(4b) 
,[�2�] n n-k k k+l n-2k-l . . L (k) (k+l) x y (1-x-y) , and (v] is the largest integer k=o 
no greater than v. 
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Proof : For n voters, let (nA, nB, n-nA-nB) be the event
where nA vote for A, nB vote for 
B and n-nA-nB abs tain . Given
qA, qB, q0 plus the independence assumption, the probability of [ n ) [ n-nA ) nA nB n-n -n (nA, nB, n-nA-nB) is calculated to be nA nB (qA) (qB) (1-qA-qB) A B
from the trinomial distribution . The res t follows easily . 
At this point it can be seen that qA' qB, a, and 8 are
simultaneously determined and that all voters' decisions (as described 
in (1) ) and expectations will be consistent and in equilibrium if 
and only if (3) and (4) are j ointly satisfied . 
Definition : A (symmetric) voters equilibrium for (GA, GB, µ)
is a 4-tuple (q�, q�, a*, 8*) such that (3a)(3b )(4a) and (4b) are 
simultaneously satisfied . 
Remarks : (1) The qualifier "symmetric" refers to the 
fact that all voters are assumed to have identical decision rules, 
(1) , and identical expectations. 
(2) This concept of  equilibrium is a special case of a 
Bayes Equilibrium in strategies, S
i : E + {O, A, B }, where, for each
e
i
, Si (e
i
) maximizes i's conditional expected utility given the
. 1 i-1 i+l n 
strategies (S , . . • ,S , S , . • .  ,S ) of  the other voters .  This is
explored more fully below in section 3b .  
Of interest, of course, is whether a voters equilibrium 
exists and what its properties are . The second question is the more 
difficult, primarily because of the cumbersome form of f(x,y) in 
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lemma 4 but as will be seen we can say some things about it . The 
first is easy and so we turn to it now. We state a simple and 
somewhat uninteresting result .  
Proposition 1 :  Given (GA, GB, µ) such that G(l, GA, GB) -
G(-1, GA, GB) = 1, (q!, q�, a*, 8*) = ( 0 , 0 ,  1, 1) is the unique
symmetric voters equilibrium . 
Proof: (existence) One can easily show by substitution 
into (3) and (4) that ( 0 ,  0 ,  1, 1) is an equilibrium under the 
assumption on G .  
(uniqueness) Under the assumption on G, i t  follows from 
(3) that qA = qB = 0 for any values of a, 8 E [ O,l ] .  Thus by (4)
a = 8 = 1 must hold . 
Several remarks are in order . First, if GA = GB then 
G(l, G) - G(-1, G) = 1 and the proposition applies . Second, if µ 
is sufficiently dispersed then G(l, G) - G(-1, G) 1 only if 
GA - GB is small . For example, consider the Type I preferences of
example 1 when there is a single issue, H = R1• Let GA - GB = E 
G + G 
and 
A 
2 
B 
= G, let c be fixed and assume d is distributed normally
with mean 0 and variance 1 .  Then G(l, G )  - G(-1, G) = 
- c J G + TET
An - c G -TET 
2x -2 
e d x < 1 whenever E > 0 .
1 
5 For Type II preferences 
with U(G, d) = - 1e - d i 2, G(l, G) - G(-1, G) = 0 if IGA - GB I
IE! S 4c2 . Otherwise, G(l, G) - G(-1, G) > 0 .
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Another thing to notice is that if G(l, G) - G(-1, G) = 1 
then expected turn out is always zero since no voter ever has preferences 
d and costs c which provide any gain from voting even if all others 
abstained. Finally, notice that it is also true that expected 
turnout is zero under minimax regret behavior (from Lemma 2) if 
G(l, G) - G(-1, G) = 1 .  Thus, this situation is somewhat uninteresting 
except that it exactly describes the equilibrium if G
A
= GB. As we
will see below, candidate competition may well produce G
A 
= GB as a
final result and, therefore, (by proposition 1) no turnout. 
Proposition 2: Given (G
A
, GB, µ )  if G(v, GA
, GB) is
continuous in r £ (-en, <D) then there exists a symmetric voters 
equilibrium for (G
A
' GB, µ) . 
Proof: Let ha(a, B) = f [q
A 
(a) , qB (B) l and h
B(a, B) =
1 1 f [qB CB), qA 
(a) ] where q
A 
(a)= 1 - G [c;:, G] and qB CB) = G(- S' G).
Then q
A 
( • ) , qB ( • ) are defined for a, B £ (0, l]. Let qA (0) = 0 and
qB (0) = 0. It is then easy to show that the function h(a, B) [h
a(a, ·'' ) , 
hB(a, B) J continuously maps [O, l] x [O, l] into itself, since G and
f are continuous respectively in r and (a, B). By Brouwer's Theorem 
there is a fix-point (a*, B*). Let q1 = qA 
(a*) and q� = qB (B*) . Then
(q1, q�, a*, B*) is an equilibrium. 
Remark: There are a variety of easily acceptable assumptions 
on U(G, d) and µ such that G(r, G) is continuous in r. For example, 
k 
let D = R , k < oo and assume: (1) U(G, d) is continuous in G for all
d £ D and (2) for each Borel subset R � D x [�, oo) , µ (R) =�� h(e) de
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where h is a continuous density function such that h(e) > 0 for all 
e £ E. In fact, these conditions are stronger than necessary. 
Perhaps unfortunately, if there are only a finite number of 
types in E (i.e. E is a finite set) it is usually the case that G is 
not continuous in r. This does not mean there is no equilibrium; 
however, proposition 2 does not cover this case. 
A simple corollary of Proposition 2 is that if there is a 
positive probability that someone will vote if all others abstain, then 
expected turnout [i.e. (n + l) (q! + q�) ]  is positive in equilibrium. 
Corollary 2.1: Given (G
A
' GB, µ) such that G is continuous
in r and G(l, G) - G(-1, G) < 1 then a voters equilibrium exists and 
q! + q� > 0.
Proof: If q1 + q� = 0 then q1 = q� = 0 and a* = B* = 1. 
But then q1 + q� = 1 - G(l, G) + G(-1, G) > 0 by assumption QED. 
c. Comparison to minimax regret
As an interesting side issue one might wish to compare expected 
percentage turnout, q1 + q�, in this expected utility model with that 
predicted by the minimax regret model of Ferejohn and Fiorina. The 
first obvious fact is that if a*, B* � I then tE � tM. If one is
tempted to conclude from this that "since a and B are small, tM > tE"
one would be wrong. To see why consider type I preferences on a single 
dimensional issues space, U(e, G) =-(a - G) 2• Let c = 1 (that is,
normalize u by c) and assume a is normally distributed with mean 0 and 
variance o. Further assume G
A 
d z and G B 
d 
2· The in voters
equilibrium a S and qA (a) qB (a)
q(ado) . Thus implicitly a ;  f [q(ado) , 
Now h(o) ; 1 
(f + f ) q' 
'( ) -
x y 
and h dCJ - l-(f + f ) ,x y q 
lim .{2" Further do-> 00 h(da) ::; _3__ for large n. n1T 
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1 2 
_
l 
J 
ado x -2 dx1 - !TI e 
0 
q(adCJ) ] or explicitly a; h(da) . 
< 0 since q' > 0 and6 f + f < 0. x y 
Thus for small values of CJd, 
a* > I which implies tE > tM while for large values of CJd, a* < I which
implies tM > tE . I have not calculated the value of dCJ for which h(CJd)
I· In any case with symmetric type I preferences, close and symmetric
platforms and small variance in tastes, higher turnout is predicted by 
this model than the minimax regret model. Large variances and distant 
platforms lead to the opposite conclusion. 1 
consider type II preferences where U(G, a) ; - I G-a i2 If we 
and let GA ; f, GB ; - % and a be distributed normally with mean 0 and
variance 1, then we find again, that for small values of d, a is near 1. 
For d :S 2 2 c , a ; 1. da However, now dCJ > 0 and therefore large values of
CJ imply a > i· Thus in the case of type II  preferences, close and
symmetric platforms and large variance in tastes leads to a higher 
prediction of turnout than under minimax regret behavior . That is the 
effect of the variance of the tastes of voters is exactly opposite under 
type I and type II preferences . 
In summary, given platforms, GA and GB, and a distribution
of preferences and costs, µ, a voters equilibrium can be defined and 
shown to exist if G is continuous . In general expected turnout seems 
to be positive although no precise figures were calculated . Further, 
whether more or less turnout is predicted by this model as opposed to 
the minimax regret model depends on the specific values of GA and GB,
the form of preferences, and their variance . Since the choice of 
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platforms is so crucial to that question, we turn now to modeling how 
they are chosen. 
2 .  Electoral Equilibrium -- 2 candidates 
a. Definition of Equilibrium
From section 1, given (GA, GB, µ) a natural concept of voters
(partial) equilibrium arises from which one can infer, for each voter, 
(q!, q�, q�) -- their probabilities of voting for A or B, or abstaining. 
Thus, given (GA' GB' µ) one can compute, assuming voters are in
equilibrium, such things as (i) the probability A wins which is 
[.!!.] n-2k+l
{ > } _!_ { _ } _ \ 2 \ n+l n-k-r+l k+r prob nA nB + 2 prob nA - nB - l l (k+r) (  k ) (qA) k;Q r;l
[n+l] 
( )k (l- _ )n-2k-r
+l _!_ \ 2 (n+l) (n-k+l) ( )k( )k(l- _ )n-2k+l qB qA qB + 2 l k k qA qB qA qB ' k;O 
or (ii) A's expected plurality, which is (n+l)(qA - qB) or (iii) 
A's
expected vote, which is (n+l) q
A
. Each of these has been proposed,
along with others, 7 as a possible objective function for candidate A. 
We will begin by considering expected plurality and reserve comment on 
the others until later in section 3a. 
Assumption 4: (a) (Expected Plurality Hypothesis) 
Given (GA, GB, µ) , both candidates act as if they wish to maximize
expected plurality under the assumption that voters are in equilibrium. 
(E.g. , A desires to maximize (n+l) [q! (GA, GB, µ) - qli (GA, GB, µ)].
(b) (Existence of voters equilibrium) Given (µ, GA, GB),
either G(l, G) - G(-1, G) - 1 or G(r, G)  is continuous in r .  
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Under this assumption, there is a natural concept of electoral 
equilibrium. 
Definition: The 4-triple (G
A
, OB, qA
, qB) is an electoral
equilibrium for µ if (a) there are a and B such that (qA' qB
, a, S) is
a voters equilibrium for (G
A
, G8, µ) and
(b) 
_ _A A A A 
w--(GA
, GB) ::: IV (GA, GB) IJ GA E H
�(G 8 ) > �(G G ) IJ G E H
A' B - A' B B 
where �(G
A
, GB) = qB(GA
, GB, µ) - qA(GA, GB, µ),
and [q
A
(G
A
, GB, µ), 
qB(GA
, GB, 
equilibrium for (G
A
, GB, µ).
µ), a, Bl for some 
B W (G
A
, GB) =-
�(G
A
, OB),
(a, B) is a voters 
Thus (G
A
, GB) is a Nash-Equilibrium of the (zero-sum) game
in which candidates' payoffs are their expected plurality under the 
assumption that voters will vote as if in voters equilibrium. 
b. Existence of Equilibrium
It is easy to show that if q
A
(G
A' 
GB, µ) is concave in GA
and convex in GB and if qB(GA
, GB, µ) is concave in GB and convex in GA
then an electoral equilibrium exists. However, these concavity properties 
need not be valid for arbitrary classes of preferences, U(G,d) , and 
priors, µ. Therefore we need to explore for what preferences and priors 
an equilibrium does exist. It turns out that both the question of 
existence and the character of equilibrium depend crucially on the 
concavity properties of the utility functions and the symmetry (or lack 
of it) of the prior distribution. Thus, we need to consider several cases. 
(i) Concave utility - symmetric prior 
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We first prove that if tastes are concave in G and the 
prior, µ, is symmetric around G then G
A
= GB = G and qA = qB = 0 is
an electoral equilibrium. We will then discuss the implications of 
weakening some of the assumptions. 
Proposition 3: If 
(i) T = Rk, k < oo 
(ii) (concave utility) For each d E D, U(G, d) is concave 
in, and 17U = [ad/G1, ... ,au/3Gk] exists for all G ET
,
(iii) (symmetric priors) there is a G such that for all 
k A A y E R  µ({eEElvu(G, d)·y � - c}) = µ({eEElvU(G, d)•y � c}), then 
(G, G, 0, 0) is an electoral equilibrium. 
Proof: Let G
A
= GB = G. Then, by definition of voters
equilibrium and proposition 1, q
A
(G
A
, GB, µ) = qB(GA
, GB, µ) = 0 
and a(G
A
, GB, µ) = S(GA
, GB, µ) 
= 1. We must show that there do not
k 1 A A 1 exist A >  0, y ER such that 1 - G(-,;-, G + f-y, G) - G[- ,;-, G + f-y, G] > 0a B 
where a= a(G + f-y, G) and B = B(G + f-y, G) . A symmetric argument will
cover B. By concavity of U in G, U(G + f-y, d) S U(G, d) + f-17U • y for 
A A 
all A > O .  From this, it is easy to show that G(r, G + f-y, G) = 
({ I U(G + >-y, d) - U(G, d) < }) > ({ I WU•y < }) . µ e "� _ r _ µ e Zc _ r , since
e E {e I f-17Uy S 2rc} implies e E {e U(G +f-y, d) U(G, d) S 2rc}. 
1 A A 1 A Thus, if 1 - G(A", G + f-y, G) - G(- ""• G + f-y, G) > 0 then 1 -a B 
µ({e I f-17Uy � Z�c} - µ({e I f-17U•y S - �}) > 0. By condition (iii)
this implies 
f-17U·y 1 AllUy 1 (5) 1 - µ({e  I 2 S -:d) - µ({e I 2 � -,;-}) > 0. c a c B 
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A A A B B A B A A B  6 Now from (4 ) ,  a - S :  f(q , q ) - f(q , q ) : (q -q ) f(q , q )  where 
AA A BA A f(·) > O .  Therefore, if q (8 + Ay, 8) - q (8 + Ay, 8) > 0 then
a < B or J. > Jc. But then it is true that µ({ea S 
µ({e I AVy � t) � 1 which contradicts ( 5 ) . QED.
1 AVUy < "} ) +
- a 
Let us look at each of the assumptions to check their 
severity. Condition (i) rules out, for instance, the social choice 
example and others where the alternative set is finite. It also 
implies issues can be measured. This is unfortunate but standard in 
spatial election models. Condition (ii) is also standard in these 
models, natural to an economist, and allows type I preferences 
[U(G, d): -(8-d) '(G-d)]. However, as we will see later there is 
some question about the empirical validity of these preferences. 
Further the entire character of equilibrium is altered if preferences 
are not concave. We will look at these issues in detail in section Zb 
(iii). 
Given the assumption of concave preferences, condition (iii) 
is the crucial restriction. Let us first see what it requires. If µ 
comes from a continuous density on E (that is, µ(R) : .J. h(e) de) then
R
a sufficient condition for (iii) is the existence of 8 such that for
all d E D  there is d' E D  such that VU(G, d): - VU(G, d') and h(d,c) 
h(d', c) for all c. For type I preferences with a shift parameter, 
U(G, d) (d-G) 'A(d-8) + yG where (A, y) is fixed and A is symmetric 
positive definite, VU: ZA(d-8) + y. In this case, if d is distributed 
by the continuous density h symmetrically around d, (i.e. h(d+d) :
h(d-d) ) and independently of c then G :  d + � A-l y satisfies (iii) .
Thus G is the ideal point of the median voter type, d. In general,
condition (iii) does not seen to imply a median voter outcome because 
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of the role of c; however, if c is independently distributed from d 
then (iii) does require the existence of a median voter of type d 
and a platform G where VU(G, d) : 0 (G is d's ideal point) .
(ii) Concave utility - asymmetric prior 
Now (iii) is clearly not a necessary condition for existence. 
Let us see what happens if (iii) is weakened by considering a class 
of examples. In particular we return to type I preferences on a 
single issue, U(G, d) : (8-d)2. Assume c is identical and known
across all voters. Let d be distributed according to the continuous 
density function 
h(d) � d a+l e 
a -ad--e 
a+l 
d '.:: 0 
d > 0 
where a > 0. We will consider different values of a and note that 
condition (iii) of proposition 3 is satisfied if and only if a : 1 in 
which case § : 0. For this class of examples we can prove
Proposition 4 :  If T : [-m1, m2], m1, m2 > 0 and if
(81, Gfi) is an electoral equilibrium for the above example, then 
01 : e� : l o if a : 1 
mz if a < 1 
-ml if a > 1 
Proof: If a : 1 proposition 3 applies. If a > 1, let 
81 > -m1 be arbitrary and suppose 81, 8� is an electoral equilibrium.
B Then W (G�, GB) � 0 for all GB. Let GB
G(r, G�, GB) H(G* - 5:. + 
re) whereA 2 E 
H(d) 
Thus for E near zero, 
� d
a+l e 
1 - _l_ -ada+l e 
G� - E where E > 0. 
if d < 0 
if d > 0.
_ _B a E C 1 E C W-=(-) exp [-a(G* - ---) - (-) exp [-a(G* --+-]. a+ 1 A 2 SE a+ 1 A 2 ctE 
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We will show that for some E near zero � > 0 and therefore G! > m1
cannot be an equilibrium. B Suppose W � 0 for all E > 0. Then for all
E > 0 a exp (G* - 5:. - _!:__) <exp [-a(G* - 5:. + _!:__) ]' A 2 SE - A 2 aE 
or 
This implies 
G* - 5:. - _!:__ + ln a <  - a(G* - 5:. + _!:__). A 2 SE - A 2 ctE 
E c 1 a G* < - + --- [-- -] - ln a.A - 2 E(l+a) S a 
We remind ourselves that as E + 0, q + A o and qB 
- � ] = -a 
+ o.
a + 1 and S + 1. s· 1 lim ince a > , E+O !r.!. E s CD • 
Thus as E + 0,
Thus, if a > 0 
and G1 > m1, there is some E near zero such that GB E T and v8 > 0. 
This establishes the proposition for a > 1 since a symmetric argument 
applies for G� > - CD. For a< 1 a similar proof applies. QED . 
The key fact to note, in understanding why the proposition 
is true, is that if GA and GB are very close to each other then because
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of the type I (quadratic loss) preferences it is only the voters in 
the tails of the distribution (the extreme positive and negative values 
of d) who will vote.
9 
Thus, for example, if a> 1 then voters with
extreme negative d are more likelylO than voters with extreme positive
d. Thus, platforms move in a negative direction. This observation
extends to more general density functions and to multidimensional 
issue spaces. 
The problem with this fact is that boundary points cannot 
be equilibria. 
Corollary 4.1: For the class of examples covered in 
proposition 4, if m1 and m2 are large enough, an equilibrium exists
if and only if a = 1. 
Proof: (if) follows from proposition 3 .  (only if) Suppose 
a> 1. If (G!, G�) is an equilibrium then G� = -m1. Let G be such
a that a+l e 
e 1 
2· That is, G is the median voter's ideal point,
.!_ < ln a+l < 0 for a > 1. 
2 - 2a 
Let GA= GB + E = -m1 
+ E and let
E c A -m + - + -= G. 1 2 ctE Thus G = - G - /- :...2 2c A (m1-G) - a (By m1 large enough
A 2 2c we mean that (m1-G) >a).
1 E c 1 Then qA = 1 - G(a' G) = 1 - H(GB + 2 + aE) = 2· 
E c 1 qB = H(GB + 2 - SE) < 2· Therefore, qA > qB and G� = -m1 cannot be an
equilibrium. A simil1r argument follows for 0 < a < 1. QED . 
One must conclude that symmetric tails are a necessary condition 
for the existence of an equilibrium. Is it sufficient? Surprisingly, 
it seems so subject to a precise definition of "tails." Returning to 
a single issue space with U = -(G - d) 2, remember that V
A
= qA - qB = 
- c - c -1 - H(G + �) - H(G - �) where E = 8 - G > 0 and G CtE BE A B 
GA + GB
2 
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Now consider av
A
/aGA -h(G + �) [
_!_ - _c_ - --'=-- �) CtE 2 2 2 2G CtE a E A 
- c
l - h[G - BE x
1 c c as r2 + -2 + -2- ael· 
A 
For E large enough av /aGA < 0. In particular if
BE B E A 
� - -'=z - --f- ;� > 0 then A will want to decrease GA. Similarly, B
etE a E A l as will want to increase GB if 2 - -'=z - -¥-as> 0. Since a= B � 1
BE B E B 
at equilibrium, we know that there is an £ such that if 1 
A c H(G + -)E 
A d A H(G - £) for all 0 < E � €, then an equilibrium exists at G. Another
way of stating this is that h(d) = h(-d) for all d � G + I . 
It should be noted that the more concave the U(•) are, the 
larger the tail which must be symmetric. Thus, e.g . ,  if U(G, d) 
- (j JG - dJ j) v for v � 1 where I JxJ I = (I xi) 112 then larger v require
larger £. In the best case (v = 1) with a single issue, £ = O ;  that is, 
no symmetry is required for existence at the median. In this case, 
I A-B 1 A+B 1 for A > B, qA = µ({e � � a and d � �2- + a}) and qB
I A-B 1 A+B 1 µ ( { e - > - and d < - --} ) • 2c - B - 2 B If A = 0 where µ({e 
A 1 d�G})=2·
A-B 1 then for all B < A, either qA = qB = 0 (when � < 1) or qA � 2 and
1 A A q8 � 2 and, therefore, v--(GA ' GB) � 0 for all GB # GA = G. The
conclusion one draws from all of this is that if preferences are 
concave, a sufficient amount of symmetry of tastes must occur if an 
equilibrium is to exist. This lack of robustness of the model is 
somewhat discouraging. 
One must however recognize that type I preferences, as well as 
strictly concave utility functions, imply a form of behavior which seems 
to be empirically invalid. I refer, in particular, to a stylized 
empirical fact: absentions increase with alienation. That is, as 
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both candidate's platforms move away from a voter's ideal platform, 
the voter is more likely to abstain. With concave and type I preferences, 
however, just the opposite is predicted. This is easiest to see by 
writing 6 = U(GA, d) - U(GB, d) = - (-GA + d)
2 + (-GB + d)
2 = 2(dE - GE)
G + G - A Bwhere E = GA - GB and G = 2
a6 -Now aG = -2 E G. a6 u E > o, ae < o 
and, therefore, as G declines, this voter is more likely to vote for A.
From our model (assuming a and B constant for now) , a voter abstains 
. f 1 6 1 1 (d (\) 1 h b . 1 - B < 2c < a or - B < - Q E < a . T us a stent1ons occur for
small values of J8-dj and not for large values . This is contrary to 
the stylized fact. We thus turn to a consideration of other types of 
preferences. 
(iii) Nonconcave utility -- some examples 
As an alternative to Type I preferences we consider those 
of Type II or U(G, d) = - JIG - dj J
112. These are convex functions
on each side of the ideal point d even though they are not convex 
over all G. 2c 2c Assume GA > GB and let r = -U- and s = 13· If T = R
1
(a single issue) then a voter with parameters (d, c) 
and 
where 
and 
(i) votes for A if G - G > r2 and G - z(r) < d < G + x(r)A B A - - A 
(ii) votes for B if GA - GB > s
2 and GB - x(s) � d � GB + z(s)
(iii) abstains otherwise, 
z(w) 
x(w) 
GA - GB
2 
G - G 
( A B2 
G D 
w(� 0B 2 
2 w 2 
2)
-2 
w 
2 �) 1/2 
4 
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Notice that if G
A 
- GB is fixed and if GA 
and GB simultaneously
move far enough away from d then the voter will abstain. Let H(•) be 
the distribution function of d (and h(•) the density function) and assume 
c is fixed and identical for all voters. Then the probability a voter 
votes for A is qA H(0 + x(r) ) - H(0 - z(r) ) if 0 - 0 > r
2
A A A B 
0 otherwise 
and the probability a voter votes for B is 
B q H(0B - x(s) ) - H(GB + z(s) ) if GA 
- GB > r
2
0 otherwise. 
The following proposition can be established for this class 
of examples. 
Proposition 5: If H(•) is continuous and unimodal at Gm
(i.e. h'(d) 2 0 for d S Gm and h'(d) S 0 for d 2 Gm) and if 8!, 8�
is an equilibrium for h then 8 - 4c2 < G
A
*' GB* < 4c
2 + 8 .m - - m 
Proof: Suppose GB*< 8 - 4c
2. Then there is c > 0 such that--- m 
G
A 
= GB + 4c
2 + c < Gm. Now c + 0 implies x + 0 and z + 0, since c + 0
implies r + 2c and s+ 2c (because a +  1 and B + 1). [Note that for 
c > 0, G
A 
- GB> r
2 and G
A 
- GB> s
2, since otherwise q
A 
= qB = 0
which implies a =  B = 1 which implies GA 
- GB> r
2, s2.J Assume s r.
There exists c > 0 such that G
A
(c) + x(c) <Gm. Therefore, h(t) � 
h[G
A
(c) - z(c) ] for all t c[G
A 
- z, G
A
+ x] and, since GB + z S GA - z,
h(t) S h(GB + z) S h(GA 
- z) for all t c[GB - x, GB + z]. Thus
qB(GA
(c) , 8�) < qA
(G
A
(c) , 0�) if r = s. Suppose r# s and qB > qA.
At a voters equilibrium
11 
if qB > qA 
then s > r since B < a. Now
'dx/'ds 1 
0 - 8 
- ( A B
2s3 2 
s
2
2
) 2 s 2 
1 GA 
- GB( 
2 
�) < 0 and 
2 
'dz/'ds 
0 - 0 2 0 - 0 2 
( A B - �) 1/2 + (�) 2 ( A B - �)-1/2 < 0 since2 4 2 2 4 
0 - 0 2 2 
[ A B _ �] + � = 
0 - 0 2 
1� ( A B - �) < 0. Thus, 'dqB as 2 4 4 2 2 
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h(GB + z) • 'dz/'ds + h(GB - x) 'dx/'ds < O. Therefore qB(h) < qB(r) <
q
A
(r) implies that if 0� < - 4c
2 + Gm then there is GA
< Gm such
that q
A 
> qB. Thus, 
proof works for G
A 
> 
proposition. QED . 
0� cannot be an equilibrium platform. A similar
4c2 + 0 and symmetry implies the rest of them 
What we have shown is that for a unimodal distribution 
of tastes and U = - Je - dJ112, any equilibrium must be concentrated
around the mode.12 Since this equals the median only for symmetric
distributions, we see immediately that non-concavities produce 
qualitatively different equilibria. 
Although proposition 5 contains necessary conditions for 
equilibrium platforms they are not sufficient. In fact, if the mean 
and the mode are too far apart (relative to 4c2) or, what is the same
thing, if the distribution of tastes is too skewed, there may be no 
equilibrium. Consider the following continuous, asymmetric density 
function for d: 
h(d) s·ebd
(1 - cd) S 
if d < 0
if O<dSR 
e-a(d-R) S(l-cR) if d � R.
where S [1:_ + R(l - 5: R) + 1:_(1 b 2 a 
-1 cR) ] , b, c, a, R > 0 and 1 - cR > 0.
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Note that h is unimodal, where d = 0 is the mode . Let GA = GB + n 
2 
1 n r 2 and assume that r = s .  Then x = -z C-z - -z-> For (n, R) such that
2 
r
2 2 A Bx > 4c , and R � x, if GB ::: Gm + 4c = 4c then q - q 
S•[(G + x) (l - � (8 + x) ) - (8 - z ) (l - � (8 - z ) )  -A 2 A A 2 A 
((8 + z)(l - � (8 + z) ) + !) - l e+b(GB-x) ] = .l S(l + e+b(GB-2) ) +B 2 B b b b 
E 2 2 2 
S[x - GB] - 2 S[(GA + x) - (GA - z) - (GB + z )  ] > 0
if x -
E 2 2 + 2 
GB > 2 [(GA + x) - (GA - z) - (GB z )  ] .  S ince x - OB > 0, 
2 we can choose E > 0 as well as n and R such that, for all GB 5 4c ,
qA - qB > 0 .  Therefore, from proposition 5 ,  i f  E small enough and R 
is large enough there can exist no equilibria since there are enough 
voters to the right of B (relative to those to the left of the median) 
to enable A to always collect a majority of those voting. 
One can state (overly strong) sufficient conditions for the 
existence of an equilibrium in this class of examples . 
Proposition 6: If h(d) is continuous and unimodal, 
u = - je - dj112, d, 8 E R' and c is fixed, let e maximize H(GA + 4c2) -8 
2 H(GA - 4c ) .  Let P(G) 
A 2 H(G + 4c ) 
A 2 H(G - 4c ) .  
A A 2 If P(G) � H(G - 4c ) 
and P(G) � 1 - H(G + 4c2) then 8! = 8� = G is an equilibrium.
qA 
Proof : Let GA 
qB = 0 .  If GB < GA
G and 8 < 0 B A " If 8 
> 8 - 4c2 thenB - A 
2 2 4c , one can show GB + z S GA - 4c < Gm.
2 If x S 4c then h(r) 2 h(GB + z) for all v = s[GA - z, GA + x] and 
h(t) ::; h(GB + z) for all t s[GB - x, GB + z]. Therefore qA > qB . 
2 If x 2 4c , qA - qB = H(OA + x) - H(GA - z) - H(OB + z) + H(GB - x) 2 
H(GA + 4c
2) - H(GA - 4c
2) + H(GB - x) - ll(GA - z). By assumption 
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2 
P(GA) � H(GA - 4c )  � H(GA - z) . Thus, qA 
> qB . A similar argument
follows for GB G and GA > OB . QED . 
One is led naturally to the following: 
· 11 I 111n k ConJecture: If U = - 8 - d for n > 1, 0, d E R , 
j jxj j = (L �)112 and if the density on (d, c) is h(d) g(c) where h
is continuous and unimodal [ i . e ., 3 o
m 
E Vh(d) •(Gm - d) > 0 v d]
and, letting p I I G  d 11
1/n max µ({(d,c) j
- ; ::; l}) and§ be the 8 c 
solution, if p � µ({(d,c) j a(d - 8) � 0 and J]e - dJJ
1/n > l} )
for all y f 0 then O
A 
= G
B 
= G is an equilibrium.
Thus if this conjecture is correct then when preferences 
are of the form - jjG - dj ll/n, (n > 1), and the distribution tastes
is unimodal and not too asynnnetric, an equilibrium exists where 
GA = GB, qA = qB = 0, and GA and GB are somewhere near the mode . 
c . Sunnnary and connnents
We can summarize the results of this section in several 
brief statements. 
(1) If utility functions are concave, and tastes are 
continuously and synnnetrically distributed, then an electoral 
equilibrium exists with both candidates selecting the median 
voter ' s  ideal point and no one votes . 
(2) If utility functions are concave and tas tes are 
asymmetrically distributed in the tails then an electoral equilibrium 
will not exist . 
( 3) If preferences are of Type II (convex on each side 
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of an ideal point) and if tastes are c ontinuously , unimodally , and 
not too asymmetrically distributed then an electoral equilib rium 
exists with both candidates choosing the modal voter ' s  ideal point 
and no one votes. 
Several comments about these results seem to be in order . 
First , if we were to substitute minimax regret behavior for our fully 
rational expected utility model of  voters , nothing substantive with 
respect to the existence of electoral equilibrium or modality of  
c andidates p latforms would be altered . None of the arguments in this 
section would be affected if we let a = S = �· Thus both models of
b h . d "d . 1 . "l"b . 13 e avior pro uce i entica outcomes in equi i rium. They are , 
there fore , only significantly dif ferent in their p redictions of  
disequilibrium phenomena if  candidates maximize expected p lurality. 
Second , the role of  the assumption of candidate irrelevance 
should not be ignored . I f  different voters have dif ferent beliefs 
about the likelihood of candidate's postelection positions then even 
if candidates were driven (by expected plurality maximization) to 
choose identical positions , there may be a positive probability of 
turnout . Further , it is highly likely if the candidates' names 
( reputations) count , that equilibria with dif ferentiated platforms 
and positive turnout will exist .  
Third , we have not considered the implications for existence 
and characterization of equilibria of the assumption that preferences 
might be a mixture of Type I and Type I I .  I t  would b e  interesting to 
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know , for example, the outcome (equilibrium) predicted by this model 
when "Republicans" have Type I preferences and are concentrated to the 
"right" of the median voter and "Democrats" have Type II preferences 
and are concentrated to the "left" of the median voter .  Technically, 
one could cons ider a distribution of  preferences constructed as a 
convex combination of Type I and Type II . For example , let hI (d)
be a density of Type I preferences and hI I (d) be a density of  Type II
preferences and then consider the implications if the actual density 
of tastes is A hI (d) + (1 - A) hII (d)  for some A £ (0, 1 ) . We leave
this exercise to the interested reader . 
Fourth , we have not explored the implications of this 
model for the standard social choice problem with a finite set of 
alternatives . A reasonable approach to that problem would be to imbed 
that set of alternatives in the real line , extend the preferences of 
voters over the line , and then apply the results of this section . 
This is in the spirit of s ingle-peaked preferences (a property that 
both Type I and Type II preferences have on the line -- although not 
if the issue space is multidimensional) and , of course , the method of 
imbedding is crucial . 14
Finally, although I have used the phrase "general equilibrium" 
in the title I have ignored at least one set of important actors 
and one type of candidate decis ion . The missing actors are political 
activists who donate funds (to change voters' likelihood b eliefs?) and 
who , by ringing doorbells,  can raise the cost of not voting and thereby 
raise turnout . The missing decis ion is the issue of whether to run or 
not . Entry into electoral competition has been ignored . 
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We turn next to some generalizations of the model and to the 
implications which arise when candidates adopt behavior other than 
expected plurality maximization . 
3. Extensions and Alterations
a. Other candidate obj ective functions
In section 2a we indicated that candidates might wish, for 
example, to maximize the probability of winning or their expected 
vote . We now consider each of these in turn . 
Let us consider a scoring function where si 1 if voter i
votes for A, 0 if they abstain, and -1 if they vote for B . Then the 
probqbility that A wins is simply PA
n . 1 prob { l s1 > O} + 2 
i=l 
prob { l Si
i 
1 
n
O}, or prob {- ln i=l 
. 1 1 i 
s1 > O} + 2 prob {� l s O} where
qA = prob {s
i = l } and qB = prob {s
i = -1}. Since each voter is
independently and identically distributed,15 as n + oo 
1 . prob {j�? s
1 - (qA - qB) I > E } + 
0 for all E > 0. Thus for large
1 
electorates a reasonable approximation of the maximization of PA
. h . . . f d 1 l" 16is t e max1m1zat1on o expecte p ura 1ty. 
One expects therefore that if candidates maximize their 
probability of winning, the outcome in large electorates will be the 
same as that which occurs if they maximize expected plurality . 
If, on the other hand, candidates maximize expected votes the 
outcomes are significantly different because of the role of absentions . 
For example, there is no tendency for platforms to converge; in fact, 
candidates will constantly try to differentiate themselves from their 
opponent .  
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A 
Lemma 5: I f  there exists an E � 
0 such that G(l, GA, GB) -
G(-1, GA, GB) > 0 whenever I jGA - GB! I > E and if G!, G� is an
electoral equilibrium under vote maximization then G! 1 G� .
Proof : If G! = G� then q! = q� = 0. But either A or B 
can change G. such that q� > 0. QED . J J 
I have not characterized further (much less established the 
existence of) electoral equilibrium under vote maximization . I t  may, 
however, be informative to consider an example . We return to a 
single-dimensional issue space with Type I preferences and c fixed 
- GA + Gsand known across all voters . As before if GA > GB, G = � and 
E = GA - GB then G(r, G) = H(G + 
r�) where H is the distribution function
of ideal points, d .  We consider only equilibria for which qA = qB . 
(Whether there may be others is an open question . )  Under the appropriate 
differentiability and symmetry conditions on H, a necessary condition17
a q 
at equilibrium is that a G
A 
A 
a qB = 0. 0 and ae 
B 
1 
Thus, z c 2a E 
c 
B E2
- E - E A and qA = 1 - H(G + 2) = H(G - 2). If H is symmetric around G then
G = G + 1:_ � and G A 2 - Ba 
minimax regret behavior a 
A 1 G - 2 V 2c where a= f(qA, qB). [For
1 a A A - and G = G + ;z- 0 = G - ;z- ] 2 A ' B • 
Although a cannot be easily solved for, we know (since qA = qB) that 
_ n !  1 n 
(n/2) ! (n/2) ! (2) '.'. a '.'. 1. By Stirlings formula, for large n,
v'T < a:;::l . nn -
Therefore, at a vote maximizing electoral equilibrium 
r,,- nn 1/4 r,,- . 
(vLc )(---z-) �GA - GB� v2c • These are not very tight bounds, but, 
whatever GA - GB is , there is always positive turnout in this  type of 
equilibrium. 
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It should be emphasized that , even for the examp le , only 
necessary conditions have been examined .  I have not yet found 
additional conditions which guarantee that these are sufficient . Thus 
it is possib le an electoral equilibrium, with vote maximizing behavior 
on the part of the candidates ,  does not exist. 
b .  More candidates and nonidentical beliefs 
Rather than proceeding through a variety of special cases , 
we next turn to a description of the general model of voter behavior 
under the extension of rationality proposed.  To do so we must introduce 
some new notation and recall some old : 
i 1, . . .  ,n + 1 voters (0 < n < en) , 
j 1 ,  • . .  , m  candidates (z :;: m :S en), 
G £ T 
j 
j 's p latform 
nj 
Qi 
n n 
G 
h :  
{� £ Rm+l 
the number of  votes for j ,  
i's decis ion function where oi = ( oi , . . .  , oi) and o m 
if i votes for j (j = 0 is abstention) then o� = 1 J 
and o� = 0 for k# j .  We will let oi (j ) =
( 0 ,  . . .  , 0 , 1 , 0 ,  . . • , 0) be i's decision to vote for j ,  
m 
I n. is a nonnegative integer and l n . = n } . J j =O J 
�n represents all possible e lection outcomes in 
terms of votes if there are n voters , 
( 01 , . . .  , 0  ) £ yn m , 
tTI x � + M(T) where M ( T) is the space of probability measures
on T and h is the outcome rule specifying the 
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probability of the winning platform. if candidates 
have platforms (81 , . . .  ,0m) and voters vote (n0, . •• ,nm) .
Remark: In section 2 where m = 2, 
h (G , �) = I GA if nA > nB 
GB 
if nB > 
nA 
Gj 
with probability i if nA = nB . 
Using the above , V ( 0 ,  n ,  di) = � U(y, di) dh(G,  n) is i's expected
utility if p latforms are G and votes are n .  
A voting strategy f o r  voter i i s  a mapping from voter 
characteristics (di , ci) to decisions . That is, o
i : E + {oi (o) , 
i i i 1 i-1 i+l n 0 ( l ) , • . . ,o (m) } .  We let z = E X•••X E x E X·· · x  E be the 
space of others ' characteristics and represent i's beliefs about 
zi £ zi by a mapping o/i : Ei + M(Zi) .  Thus , if i has characteristic ei 
he believes others'  are distributed according to o/i ( ei ) .  With these 
beliefs and with knowledge of the strategies of others', o) i ( = 
( _,.l _,.i-1 _,.i+l n) • I  d ·1· • u , • . .  ,u ,u , . . .  , o , 1 s expecte ut1 1ty from voting for 
(the decision oi (j ) )  is w\ oi (j ) ,  o) i (' ei) -
J V(G , oi (j ) + l oh (eh) ,  ei) d  o/i (ei) - (1 - o! (j ) ) Ci . 
h+i 
The integral is i ' s  expected utility of the outcome of the 
election and (1 - o
i(j ) )  '(;i is the cost of his decision . 0 That i s ,  
(1 - oi (j ) ) Ci �Ci i f  j = l ,  . . • , m  and i t  i s  0 if  i abstains by choosing0 
j = 0 .  
We can now state precisely the generalization o f  a voter 
equilib rium introduced in Section 2. 
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Definit ion : A voters ' equilib rium for < (8
1 , . . .  , 8m
) ,
1 n+l . . -1 -n+l P , . . .  , P  > is an n + 1 - t rup le of s trategies (6 , . . .  , o ) such 
that for all i = l , . • .  ,n + 1 and all ei £ Ei , 8i ( ei) solves
Ma . . wi c� i c · >  :o) i (  i ) ximi ze •J J , u , e . 
j =O ,  • . •  , m  
This concep t o f  equilib rium i s  identical t o  that of  a 
Bayes equilibrium . 
For a variety of reasons , this model is extremely difficult 
to analyze without further assumpt ions on the structure of beliefs . 
Thus we introduce the following:  
Assumption :  ( independent - identical beliefs) For each 
voter i ,  Pi ( ei) = µ x· · · X µ where Eh = E for all h and µ £  M(E) . 
Under this assumpt ion there is one voters ' equilibrium which 
is of particular interes t ;  the one in which all strategies are identical . 
Definition : A symmetric voters equilibrium is a voters 
equilibrium such that o
i ( • )  = o* ( • )  for all i = l, . . .  ,n + 1 .
We consider only symmetric equilibria throughout the rest of  
this paper and thus need only look at  a common strategy , cS .  
Given a strategy 0,  the probability a voter votes for 
candidate j is 
qj = µ ( {e I aCe> = o U > } > . 
Thus , if all h use cS, the probab ility that the votes tally to n = 
(n0 , . . .  ,nm
) when i is not considered can be computed to be 
p (� . q)  n !  n ! . . .  n ! o m 
n n 
(q ) o • • • ( q  ) m o m ( 6 )  
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Further , the probability of n if i votes for j is P (E_ - oi ( j ) ,  q ) . 
The refore i ' s  expected ut ility of voting for j given o is 
W . (8, e
i) J I V (8, n ,  e
i) P (� - o (j ) )  - ( 1  - oo (j ) ) C
i 
nf�n+l 
If we let R . (8, p) = {e / W . (8,  e) > Wk(8,  e) for allJ J 
k = O ,  . . •  , m  and k # j } ,  then the probability a voter votes for j is 
( 7 )  q . = µ (R . (8,  p) ] for j J J 0 ,  . . .  , m .  
Remark :  o* i s  a symme tric voters equilibrium for <8,  µ >  
if and only if  ( i )  o* (e)  o (j )  when e £ R . (8 ,  p*( • ,  q*) ) ,  and ( ii)J 
p* and q* simultaneously satisfy (6) and ( 7 ) . 
Remark : In applications one need only calculate p (n) f or 
n 3 h (8 ,  n) # h (8 ,  n - oi (j ) )  for some j = O ,  • . .  , m .  Further one can
"lump toge ther" all n , n '  3 h (8 ,  n) = h (8 ,  n ' )  and h (8, n - cS i (j ) )
h(8,  n '  - cS i (j ) )  for all j .  In section 1 ,  a =  p3 + p4 and B = p2 + P 3 
did j ust  tha t .  See Mckelvey and Ordeshook ( 19 7 2 ) . 
With one more definition , the continuity of µ ,  we can s tate 
an existence result for a symme tric voters equilibrium and s ome 
implications for turnout . 
Definit ion : µ £ M(E) is "continuous" if Aq + A0 9 µ (Aq ) + µ ( A0) 
where Aq + A0 iff ( 1) aq £ Aq , aq + a0 =? a0 £ A0 and ( 2 )
0 0 a f A =0> 3  aq £ Aq 3 aq + 0 a • 
Propos it ion 7 :  A symme tric voters equilibrium exists for 
<8, µ> if (a)  µ is continuous and (b)  V is cont inuous in ei . 
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Proof : Since q £ [ O , l ]
m+l and p £ [O , l ]
n !
, if µ (R . (8 ,  p ) )J 
is continuous in p then , since p (n ,  q) is continuous in q ,  Brouwer ' s  
theorem applies and we are done . Thus it is sufficient to note that 
R . (8 , p) is a continuous correspondence in p since V is continuous J 
in e and W . is linear in p .  QED . J 
i 
J
i Remark : (1) Remember V(8 ,  n ,  e ) ;  
H 
U(y, d )  dh (8, n) .
k 
Therefore , if U is continuous in d so is V. ( 2) If E x [ 6 ,  00) � R and
µ (D) J
D 
h ( e , c) dcdc where h is continuous , then µ is "continuous . "  
Corollary 7 . 1 :  I f  the outcome function h has the property 
that h (<n+l , 0 ,  • . .  , 0> , 8) 8 . with probability _!_ V j andJ m 
h (<n , O ,  • . .  , O> + o (j ) , 8) 8 . , then expected turnout is zero in a 
m 
symmetric voters equilibrium if and only if µ ( {e I _!_  l U (8 . , d)m j ;l J 
J 
> max 
j 
U(d) 
U (8 . , d) - c } ) ; 1 .  J 
Corollary 7 . 2 :  (a) I f  8
1
; . . .  ; G
m
, then q� ; 1 ,
max U(8 . , d) and U(e )  
j J -
min U(8 . , d) . Then (b . l) if
j J 
I m-1 µ ( {e c > - (U(d) - U (d) ) } )  m - 1 then q� ; 1 ,
1 A (b . 2 )  if µ ( { e  J c < - (U(d) - U (d) } )  > 0 then q* < 1 .m - o 
(b) Let 
For Type I preferences if µ is represented by a continuous 
positive density on R
k 
and if 8
j 
# Gk for some j ,  k;l , . • .  , m ,  then (b . 2 ) 
ob tains and expected turnout is positive . 
One should not rush from Corollary 7 . 2  to the conclusion 
that turnout increases as the number of candidates increase . To examine 
that issue one must consider also candidate competition given voters 
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behavior . Unfortunately , as the reader probably knows , M candidate 
competition (m � 3) is much more complex than that analyzed in 
section 2 .  Two new considerations enter . First ,  it is now conceivable 
and likely that voters may not vote for their most preferred 
candidate . 18 That is , candidate j may receive votes from voters
who prefer candidate i to j to k if those voters view the probability 
of affecting the election of i as much smaller than that of affecting 
the election of j .  Second , if all m platforms are identical any one 
candidate , j ,  need only ensure that qi > _l_l q ' ,  where q '  is them-
p rob ability i votes for the others , to be better off . Thus as m 
increases it is more probable that candidates can easily gain by 
shifting away from common platforms . However if j does this and then 
k moves between 8j and 8 '  ( the platform of others) , k may capture most
of the votes for 8' by the fact that they vote for their second highest 
alternative and thus � # 8' is not an equilibrium. Under certainty , 
equilibria with m � 3 are rare . For the model in this paper they 
are more likely to exist because of the uncertainty and the possibility 
of abstentions ; however ,  it is probable that equilibria with m > 2 
are less likely than those with m ;  2 .  This remains an open question. 
c. Some thoughts on testing
One issue which is constantly raised concerns the empirical 
validity of a model .  " I s  i t  consistent with facts ?" 
Let us first consider some facts which cannot be addressed . 
Since <8, µ> are the only exogenous variables in the voters model and 
µ is the only variable in the full model ,  a question like "How is 
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turnout affected by perceived c loseness and /or party differences ?"  
cannot b e  addressed since turnout and c loseness are simultaneously 
determined in the voters model while turnout , c loseness , and party 
difference are s imultaneously det ermined in the full model . Thus 
regressions of the form used by Ferej ohn and Fiorina ( 19 7 5 )  are 
incorrec t ly specified in the context of this model . I mus t  admit it 
is possib le that partial effects may b e  identifiable from s ome reduced 
form regressions ; however , I suspect not . To see why let us consider 
a variation on the two candidate model in which we let a vote r ' s  
characteristic b e  (e
i
, b
i) where ei p arameterizes ( tastes , cos t s )
and b i parameter izes beliefs . A s trategy is now a function of
(e , b ) . I f  we assume that when i is (ei , b
i
) he acts as  if  all other
voters believe µ £ M(E) is µ ( • ,  b i) ,  we can then partition E x  B into
four sets by choosing the values of two parameters (p , y) as follows : 
{ (e ,  b )  ju (GA, d)  Al l  u (GB , d) I s p , a* s y }
A1 2  = { (e ,  b) I j u (GA ' d) - U ( GB , d) I :; p ,  a* ::: y }
and so forth , where a* is evaluated at the voters equilib rium for b .  
Thus , for example , A2 1  represents the tastes and beliefs
which would yield a response that party differences are large and the 
elect ion will be close . µ (A . .  ) would be the probab ility that a l.J 
randomly selec ted voter belongs in A . . . Thus , by sui tab le choice of l.J 
µ, p, and y (and the class of  pre ferences and be liefs , E x B) one
might be able to "explain" all response patterns . 
This is an uncomfortab le c onclus ion in that it seems to 
say the model has no predictive value with respect to voting behavior . 
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I think , howeve r ,  that is the wrong conclusion . In fact the model 
predicts ( in 2 candidate elect ions) very precise outcome s .  For 
examp le if tastes are symmetrically and unimodally distributed then 
b oth candidates final platforms should be near the median and 
modal voters choice and turnout should be light (or zero) . Also , 
as we saw, asymmetries and the composition of tastes (Type I or 
Type I I  preferences) s ignificantly affected the predicted outcomes . 
Thus , in fact the model is "testab le . "  Further,  since -- in general 
equilibrium -- b oth our model of voter behavior and the Ferej ohn-
Fiorina model predict identical outcomes , one must either await 
further refinements of each or use "disequilibrium phenomena" to 
dif ferent iate between the two . 
Needless to say ,  there is much more work to be done b efore 
we fully understand the comp lete implicat ions of all the s imultaneous 
interactions be tween voters and candidates . 
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APPENDIX 
In this appendix we collect some results dealing with 
the comparative s tatics of a symmetric voters equilibrium for 2 
candidate elec tions . 
Lemma A. l :  I f  G ( r ,  GA, GB) has continuous 2nd derivatives
in ( r ,  G) in a neighborhood of c:* , G*) and (- 6
1
* , 0*) where (a* , S
* ,  G*)
is a symmetric equilibrium for <0* , µ> then the s olut ions , <a(0) , 
S (0) > of 
f [ q
A(0,  a) , q
B
(0, S) )  - a =  0 
f [q
B
(G, S) ,  q
A
(0, a) ) - S = 0 
have cont inuous firs t derivat ives in G in those neighborhoods if 
D fl 
A - 1 
1 qa 
2 A f2 qa 
where fl . 
a f (qA B 
z 1S 
, 
q 
) 
a B q 
1 B fz qs 
2 B f1 qs - 1
 
Proof : Implicit function Theorem. 
# 0 
Lemma A . 2 :  Under the conditions of Lemma A . l ,  
A d q 
� 
B .i__g_ 
dx 
l 
A + A qx qa
B A 
qx - qa 
1 B B 2 A lf2 qx - q6 f l qx 
1 B B 2 A fl qx 
- qs f2 qx 
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where x E {GA , GB } .  Furthe r ,  if q
A 
= q
B then
where j 
[ Note : 
d q
j 
-- = 0 dx 
A ,  B ,  A 
d q
j 
dx 
a = a ,  S
B 
q
j ( 1x 
s .  
f • qj . ) 1 Ct] 
f1 
< 0 when q
A = q
B from next lemma and q�j � 0 implies
iff 
. A B 
qJ = o whenever q = q . ]x 
Lemma A . 3 :  For 
f ( x , y) 
[.!!.] J. 2 n !  k k 
k=O k ! k ! n-k ! 
x y ( l-x-y) n-2k
[
n-1
+ I  
-
2-1 
k=O 
n !  k k+l 
k ! k+l ! (n-2k-l) ! 
x y ( l-x-y)
n-2k-l 
' 
f x 
[
n-1 
(y-x) l 
21 
k=l 
n !  k-1 k n-2k-l ---- x y ( 1-x-y) 
f y 
- x 
[
n-1 
l
-
2 l 
k=l 
n_! _ k-1 k 
k ! k+l ! n-2k ! x y ( l-x-y)
n-2k-l
n-1 
- n ( l-x-y) , 
�) I (x-y) l n . k-1 k-1 n-2k 
k=l k ! k-
l ! n-2k !  x Y ( 1-x-y) 
4 3  
Thus , for example ,  i f  x = y then f = 0 and f < 0 ,  i f  x > y then y x 
fx < 0 ,  
sign . 
[
n-1 z: -
2
-l 
k=O 
f > 0 and if x < y then f < 0 anf f y y x 
is of indeterminate
Lemma A . 4 :  
Proof : a -
n !  
k ! k+l ! n-Zk-1 ! 
B A A B A B (a - S) = ( q  - q ) f ( q  , q ) where f ( q  , q ) � 0 .
A B B A 
S = f ( q  , q ) - f ( q  , q ) = (y-x) 
k k( l  ) n-Zk-1 x y -x-y . 
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FOOTNOTES 
* I wish to thank both the Fairchild Foundation ( as a Fairchild
Scholar at Caltech) and the National Science Foundat ion 
( Grant #SOC 76-20953 to the Center for Mathematical Studies
in Economics and Management Science , at Northwestern University)
for their support . My debt to John Ferej ohn and Morris Fiorina,
who t o lerated my incursion into their domain with p atience , 
help , and humor, will be obvious to any reader . A seminar at
Caltech brought forth the expected boos , "what is that ? " , and 
help . I thank the participants . Finally , as expected , I alone
remain responsib le for any errors and misrepresentations which
may be lef t .
1 .  For a good summary o f  this li terature see Ferej ohn and Fiorina 
( 1 9 74) . 
2 .  The excep tions include the model of Hinich , Ledyard ,  and 
Ordeshook ( 19 72) in which voters choose probabilis t ically 
across voters . However ,  no model of individual decisions was 
given there to j us tify this behavior . Maybe none exists . 
3 .  We use Kramer ' s  ( 1 9 7 7 )  terminology . 
4 .  In their (1974)  art icle , p .  5 2 7  they acknowledge the interactions 
of voters ' decis ions but suggest it is "a highly complex 
situation . "  
5 .  The basis for this claim i s  provided in Section 2 . b  ( iii) . 
6 .  See the appendix for these facts .  
7 .  See the article by Aranson, Hinich , and Ordeshook for these . 
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8 .  We later give an example of asymmetrically distributed tastes 
in which an electoral equilibrium does not exist .  
9 .  The tail wags the dog? 
10 . For negative values of x ,  the proportion of voters with d � x 
· a x f · · 1 f h · f is a+l e ; or positive va ues o x t e proportion o voters
with d � x is 
a�l e
-ax
if a > l . 
- a -x 1 -ax For arbitrary x > 0 ,  a+l e > a+l e 
1 1 .  See the appendix for the following fact . 
12 . See Hinich ( 19 7 7) for a similar result in a slightly different 
model . 
1 3 .  Closeness may not count but it seems to be inevitable . 
14 . This approach must be well known to social choice theorists . 
I would welcome references on related work by others . 
15 . If  voters ' beliefs , and therefore their voting , are not 
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independently and identically distributed , this approximation 
may be incorrect . 
16 . I f  q
A 
> q
B 
then pA is almost 1 .  If q
A 
q
B 
then pA is almost
i and if qA < qB then pA is approximately 0 .
1 7 . See the appendix for this . 
18 . See Ferej ohn and Fiorina (1974)  for the case when m 3 .
4 7  
REFERENCES 
Aranson, P . , M. Hinich and P .  Ordeshook , "Elect ion Goals and 
S trategies : Equivalent and Nonequivalent Candidate Obj ectives , "  
American Poli tical S cience Review , 68 , ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 135-152 . 
Davis , 0 . , M. Hinich , and P .  Ordeshook , "An Expository Development 
of a Mathematical Model of the Electoral Process" American 
Polit ical S cience Review , 64 , ( 19 70) , 426-448 . 
Downs , A. , "An Economic Theory of Democracy" Harper and Row 
( 195 7 ) . 
Ferej ohn ,  J .  and M. Fiorina , "The Paradox of Not Votin g :  A 
Decision Theoret i c  Analysis , "  American Political Science Review , 
6 8 ,  ( 19 74) , 525-5 3 6 .  
Ferej ohn , J .  and M .  Fiorina "Closeness Counts only in Horseshoes 
and Dancing , "  American Political Science Review , 69 , ( 19 7 5 ) , 
920-925 . 
H inich , M. , "Equilib rium in Spatial Voting ; the Median Vo ter Result 
is an Ar tifact , "  Journal of Economic Theory , 16 , ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 
208-219 . 
48 
Hinich , M.  , J. Ledyard and P .  Ordeshook "Non-Voting and the Existence 
of Equilibrium Under Maj ority Rule , "  Journal of Economic Theory , 
4 ,  ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 144-15 3 .  
Kramer, G .  " A  Dynamic Model of Political Equilibrium, " Journal of 
Economic Theory, 16 , ( 19 7 7 ) , 310-334 . 
McKelvey , R .  and P .  Ordeshook "A General Theory of the Calculus of  
Voting , "  in Mathematical Applications in Political Science VI . ,
( eds . )  Herudon and Bernd , University of  Virginia Press,  ( 19 7 2 ) . 
Riker,  W .  and P .  Ordeshook "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting , "  
American Political Science Review , 62 , ( 1968) , 
Tullock, G .  Towards a Mathematics o f  Politics University of Michigan 
Press ( 1 96 7 ) . 
